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The imperative to coordinate international economic relations was one of the fundamental 
lessons learned from the inter-war great depression and the profound military conflicts that 
ensued, first in East Asia in the 1930s and then in the global war of 1939-45.  Famously, 
Keynes criticised the punitive economic peace settlement after the Great War of 1914-1919 
for creating the conditions for renewed economic and political conflict.1  Accompanying the 
interwar reparations-war debt cycle was the disastrous mismanagement of the international 
monetary system, which by Eichengreen and others blame for prolonging and spreading the 
interwar Great Depression.2   Efforts in the 1920s to coordinate the reestablishment of the 
gold standard in a revised form that reduced the role of gold and increased discretion 
ultimately failed, due in part to the politicisation of the exchange rate that exposed the 
dislocation between economic and political objectives.3  Kindleberger’s classic account of 
the causes of the interwar depression argued that the failure of international leadership 
from the USA as the world’s dominant economy left a vacuum of power and influence.4  The 
result was an uncoordinated system prey to inappropriate exchange rates that were 
defended through a retreat to economic nationalism.  Gardner and others have shown that 
several lessons were learned as a result, including the need for careful planning and 
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forethought in the design of a lasting peace, the need for an independent arbiter to 
overcome nationalist tendencies (and to avoid domination by a single state) and the 
importance of economic cooperation for political cohesion and peace.5  Like their 
predecessors after the First World War, the consensus among planners in the 1940s was 
that a pegged exchange rate system that stabilised the prices of national currencies offered 
the best prospect for predicable and efficient international trade and payments, and 
therefore the best prospect to reap the gains from trade and ensure prosperity for 
beleaguered populations.6  Given the perils of the interwar gold standard, a stable 
international payments system was considered a vital foundation on which to promote freer 
and non-discriminatory trade.  Without convertible currencies at stable exchange rates, the 
international trading system could not be rebuilt along a multilateral system that would 
ensure equal status for all partners, and the greatest freedom to exploit the gains from 
trade through international specialisation for mutual benefit.  After the protectionism and 
conflict of the interwar period, economic and commercial cooperation was considered vital 
to a sustained peace.  But there were limits to the extent of economic integration that was 
supportable in nation states committed to ambitious plans for popular welfare programmes, 
growth and full employment that mitigated against the devolution of sovereignty required 
by economic integration.7 
          At a global level, the momentum toward a more open and carefully managed 
international economic system evaporated quite soon after the end of the War.  The 
International Trade Organisation was still-born in 1947, leaving the less institutionally robust 
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade as the functional route to trade liberalisation.8  The 
collective desire for supranational institutions to govern the international economy did not 
survive much beyond 1945, but more progress was achieved for the international monetary 
system, partly because the negotiations on this topic concluded earlier than for trade.  The 
Bretton Woods conference in 1944 established the key institutions; the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
which would provide the leadership and coordination of the system, but the underlying 
mechanics were flawed.9  The war had not yet officially ended, but it was clear that the 
economic damage had been considerable due to the diversion of resources, the dislocation 
of markets both nationally and internationally and the reshaping of economic power.  The 
Bretton Woods delegates recognised the need for a period of transition from the end of the 
war before the controls on convertibility of currencies at stable exchange rates could be 
removed, but they underestimated the length of this transition.  Instead of a swift adoption 
of the requirements for open multilateral trade, the wartime institutions that focused on 
regional systems had to persist.   
     For Britain, the empire and the Commonwealth this meant that the controls protecting 
the international role of sterling before and during the war were continued. Convertibility 
was extended only to the central banks of a group of countries that agreed to peg their 
exchange rate to sterling and economise on their use of dollars and other foreign exchange 
by imposing controls on their residents.  The 1947 Exchange Control Act established a set of 
Scheduled Territories where freer trade and payments prevailed, a group that quickly 
became known as the Sterling Area.  This group grew out of, but was not identical to, the 
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interwar Sterling Bloc, which was a much broader and loosely organised group of countries 
in Europe, the Commonwealth, Latin America and the Middle East which pegged their 
exchange rate to sterling and enjoyed freer payments with the UK.10  The postwar Sterling 
Area, by contrast, was legally identified in the Exchange Control Act and focused on a 
narrower range of countries that included the Commonwealth (except Canada) and British 
colonies, Burma, Ireland and Iceland and various Middle Eastern states including Iraq, 
Kuwait, Persian Gulf emirates.  It thus overlapped with, but was not identical to Britain’s 
imperial reach. 
     The Sterling Area persisted as a legal entity for over a quarter of a century after the war, 
despite dramatic changes in the international monetary system in which it operated and the 
dismantling of the British empire. The longevity of this grouping, which was essentially 
borne from the maelstrom of wartime and post-war global uncertainty and dislocation, is 
remarkable in itself.  It was formally dissolved only in 1972, by which time there had been a 
dramatic reconfiguration of the international monetary system.  The sterling area survived 
the short-lived convertibility debacle of 1947, the advent of current account convertibility at 
the end of 1958, the weakness of the gold value of the dollar from 1962, Britain’s repeated 
applications to join the European Economic Community (EEC) and finally the suspension of 
gold’s role in the international monetary system from 1968-1971.11  It was finally ended as a 
minor element in Britain’s move to a floating exchange rate in June 1972, which marked the 
end of the UK’s adherence to the Bretton Woods ideal of stable exchange rates.  The post-
war history of the sterling area thus offers an interesting case of prolonged disintegration of 
monetary relations.  Its longevity is best understood by recognising that it was a relatively 
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open and unbinding network that adapted to the changing balance of influence in the 
international economic system.  It conferred benefits on the British at its centre, but also for 
the participants themselves in an environment of complex and changing global economic 
relations. 
     The disintegration of the sterling area can be periodised as follows. From 1946 to 1952 
the system operated as a relatively closed structure, while from 1952-1958 trade and 
payments were liberalised.  From 1959-1967 countries diversified their economic relations 
and tensions emerged about the role of sterling, which resulted in the formalisation of these 
relations from 1968-1972 in transparent contractual exchanges of letters between Britain 
and each of the 34 members of the sterling area.  The following sections will address each of 
these periods in turn. 
 
I  The Sterling Area in the 1950s 
As part of the war effort, British expenditure in the Commonwealth and empire was 
increasingly paid for through the accumulation of British government securities by the 
creditor.  This resulted in exceptionally large war-related liabilities by the end of 1945 
concentrated in the South Asian colonies that achieved independence in the late 1940s; 
India, Pakistan and Ceylon.  The accumulation of external sterling liabilities exceeded the 
foreign exchange reserves held in the Bank of England by about four times, so clearly 
allowing this sterling to be converted to dollars or other foreign exchange had to be 
prevented.  There followed a series of bilateral negotiations with substantial sterling holders 
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through the five years after the end of the War to mutually agree the pace of convertibility 
and spending of these wartime accumulations of sterling assets.12   
     As a result of spending by Britain’s largest creditors and accumulations by others in the 
primary product boom of the early 1950s, the geographic distribution of national holdings of 
sterling was transformed.  Figure 1 shows that the war debts to South Asia were replaced by 
accumulations in Africa and the Far East and then by oil producers in the Middle East during 
the 1950s.  The distribution of sterling held in foreign exchange reserves thus reflected post-
war commodity booms and the rise of East Asia rather than the legacy of the Second World 
War.  Through this process, the particularism of the post-war settlement receded as a 
binding rationale for the sterling area. 
 
 
Source: Treasury Historical Memorandum, History of the Sterling Balances since 1945.   
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   The immediate post-war years were characterised by tight exchange controls on 
convertibility for all European currencies, so sterling was not exceptional in this respect.  
However, the use of sterling in international payments by third countries combined with the 
large volume wartime debts made controls on sterling’s convertibility a particular focus of 
Anglo-American relations after the war.13  As a quid pro quo for the July 1946 loan of $3.75 
billion, the US insisted that sterling should be convertible within one year to ensure timely 
progress toward the multilateral payments system devised at Bretton Woods.  In the end, 
the drain on the central reserves in July and August 1947 required the quick suspension of 
convertibility and this disastrous experiment encouraged all European governments to 
postpone the transition to full currency convertibility.  Instead, a controlled process of 
liberalisation of trade alongside more tentative and limited current account convertibility of 
European currencies ensued with the establishment of the GATT in 1947 and the European 
Payments Union in 1950.14 
     The sterling area system moved into a period of greater coordination to cope with the 
imbalance of the global economy after the war and the dollar shortage.  At the July 1949 
Commonwealth Economic Conference, finance ministers of the Commonwealth members of 
the sterling area agreed to coordinated import targets to economise on the dollars available 
for the sterling area as a whole, by following the British example of a quantitative cut of 25% 
on imports from the USA.15  This resolution was quickly overtaken by the devaluation of 
sterling by 30 per cent in September 1949, which aided the countries in achieving their 
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target in 1950.  The initiative for coordinated trade policy reflected the British view of the 
sterling area as a complementary system where producers of primary products (food and 
raw materials) would supply the British population and industry in return for manufactured 
goods from the factories of Britain.  Unfortunately for this vision, the overseas sterling area 
countries had ambitions for industrial development themselves and sought more 
competitive manufactures both in terms of price and quality from European, American and 
Japanese producers.16   
     In the wake of severe balance of payments difficulties and the dislocation of the 
international economy, the controls of 1949 were continued through to 1951, but 
thereafter the closed and coordinated stage of the sterling area system began to unwind.  
When the rearmament associated with the Korean War of 1950-52 sparked a boom in 
demand for commodities, the fortunes of primary producers in the sterling area was 
transformed.  Australian wool, Indian cotton, Malayan tin and rubber and Pakistan’s jute 
exports all soared.  Substantial surpluses in Africa, Australasia and Southeast Asia bolstered 
the central reserves and financed greater imports into the UK in 1950-51, but the 
asymmetry between deficits in the UK and surpluses elsewhere in the sterling area became 
even more apparent.  Rather than constraining their demand for dollar imports and pooling 
their reserves for use in London, these countries all increased their imports substantially.  
British efforts to coerce the sterling area to conserve dollars by anticipating a looming crisis 
fell on increasingly deaf ears.17  In January 1952 sterling area finance ministers reluctantly 
accepted fresh targets for dollar imports, but this was the last time that coordinated trade 
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agreements formed part of the sterling area system.  The December 1952 Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers meeting concentrated instead on liberalisation of payments. 
     By this time Australia, as Britain’s largest trading partner in the sterling area, began to 
lead a campaign to increase the convertibility of sterling and reduce the closed nature of the 
sterling area system.  The Australian Treasury ended trade discrimination in favour of the UK 
from March 1952, when it imposed restrictions on imports from all countries.  Other 
countries followed, including South Africa from 1954 and Pakistan from 1955. Partly as a 
result of the erosion of trade discrimination in favour of the UK, Britain’s share of sterling 
area trade declined steadily.  Table 1 shows the weakening of the trade ties binding 
members of the sterling area to the UK market through the 1950s.  In 1953 62% of 
manufacturing imports into the overseas sterling area came from the UK but by 1959 this 
had fallen to 48%.  For most countries, British manufactures were replaced by German, 
Japanese and US products. 
Table 1: Share of Imported Manufactures from the UK (per cent) 
 1953 1959 
Overseas Sterling Area 62.4 48.2 
Australia 70.7 52 
New Zealand 84.5 72.2 
India 49.8 44.3 
Pakistan 43.2 35.9 
South Africa 50.5 42.0 
Iraq 52.6 42.8 
Malaya 60.3 40.3 
10 
 
Source: C. Schenk, Britain and the Sterling Area; from devaluation to convertibility in the 
1950s, Routledge (1994) p. 81. 
 
     The unwillingness of Australia and other partners to persist with a closed system that 
constrained their economic diversification formed part of the motivation for a series of 
initiatives to increase the convertibility of sterling over this period including the famous 
ROBOT plan for convertibility with a floating exchange rate and the abortive Collective 
Approach to convertibility in 1952, that would have seen a common European move to 
convertibility funded by credits from the USA.18  After the failure of these initiatives, the 
Bank of England turned to a lower key technical approach that culminated in the 
achievement of de facto convertibility on current account at a supported official rate in 
February 1955.  From this time sterling could be traded in New York at the official exchange 
rate supported by the Bank of England.  Over the next three years, West European partners 
discussed the timing for a coordinated progression to formal current account convertibility, 
with the final ‘Operation Unicorn’ completed at the end of 1958 when all major European 
currencies were made convertible.  Finally, it seemed the prerequisites were in place for the 
multilateral payments system designed at Bretton Woods to operate.   
     It is perhaps surprising that the sterling area set of controls persisted through the advent 
of current account convertibility, but the terms of this much heralded stage of development 
were actually quite restricted.  Sterling was convertible only for holders outside the UK and 
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sterling area, while the central banks of the sterling area continued to exercise exchange 
controls on the transactions of their residents.  Tight controls remained on capital 
transactions, including international borrowing and investment; indeed capital controls 
were intensified through the 1950s and 1960s to support the balance of payments.  This 
dichotomy reflected the Bretton Woods ethos that trade was an engine of growth, but 
international capital flows were a perfidious and dangerous distraction that could 
destabilise real economic activity.  The emphasis was therefore on liberalisation of trade 
and commerce, but continued restriction of international capital flows.19   
     By this time, most central banks outside the sterling area had divested themselves of 
their sterling reserves and accumulated US dollars instead.   Conversely, members of the 
sterling area continued to peg their exchange rates to sterling and to hold most of their 
reserves in sterling.  The terms of the UK Exchange Control Act provided these scheduled 
territories with freer access to the London capital market for borrowing than for other 
countries, which was an important incentive to remain within the system in the context of 
tight capital markets in Europe and the USA.  The sterling area thus delivered mutual benefit 
since it bolstered foreign exchange reserves and reduced the risk of a run on the pound for 
the UK while maximising access to the London capital market for other members at a time 
of generalised capital controls that restricted access to other lenders. Underpinning this 
bilateral trade-off was a mutual interest in protecting the value of sterling and reducing 
exchange risk for the vast majority of economic transactions between the partners that was 
denominated in sterling during the 1950s.  Through the 1960s, however, these mutual 
interests began to erode and the system entered a new stage. 
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II Sterling Area in the 1960s 
Despite the exchange control network operated by members of the sterling area, the global 
convertibility of sterling was greatly enhanced by the formal liberalisation of European 
payments from the end of 1958.  Very soon thereafter, the foundation of the pegged 
exchange rate began to erode with a loss of confidence in the gold value of the US dollar.  
Since most other currencies were pegged either to the dollar or indirectly to the dollar 
through sterling, the basis of the Bretton Woods system was under threat.  This danger 
drew the major central banks into a formal coordinated support mechanism to support the 
gold price in the London market from 1961, the so-called Gold Pool.20  During the 1960s the 
Bretton Woods system was further undermined by innovations in international banking and 
capital markets, first with the expansion of the Eurodollar market and then its translation 
into the Eurobond market.  These markets operated outside the capital controls and 
prudential supervisory systems of national central banks and allowed greater convertibility 
to stretch the post-war solution to the Mundell-Fleming policy trilemma, which relied on 
closed capital markets to facilitate pegged exchange rates while preserving national 
monetary policy sovereignty.21  
     The 1960s also became the decade of decolonisation and was identified as the United 
Nations (UN) Development Decade.  In this changing geopolitical context many countries in 
the sterling area sought opportunities to diversify the sectoral distribution of their 
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economies and also their international economic relationships.22  At the same time, new 
customers created by the internationalisation of US business created demand for financial 
innovation and led to a revival of international banking in Europe, especially in the City of 
London.23   Controls on sterling persisted even while there was greater opportunity to 
function in London using the US dollar.  In the wake of a balance of payments crisis in 1966 
the British Treasury imposed new controls to restrain reinvestment of profits in the British 
dominions, specifically targeted at Australia, New Zealand and South Africa.  The benefits of 
preferred access to the London capital market for members of the sterling area were thus 
being eroded by a tightening in London and by greater opportunity in European and 
American markets.   New central banks were established in former colonies such as Ghana, 
Nigeria and Malaysia who were substantial holders of sterling reserves.  Although they kept 
their currencies pegged to sterling through the decade and retained the bulk of their 
reserves in sterling, the institutional foundations for a more independent policy were 
established.24 
     As an example of this process, Figure 2 shows the changes in the role of sterling in the 
international economic relations of Australia, the largest economy in the overseas sterling 
area.  At the beginning of the 1960s over 90% of reserves were denominated in sterling, but 
this was rapidly reduced, mainly through retained earnings of US dollars through the 
decade.  On a similar but less dramatic scale the denomination of overseas debt obligations 
shifted away from sterling and toward the dollar (and DM, SwFr).  At the same time, 
Australia’s trade was already in a process of diversifying away from the UK and toward 
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Japan and the USA at the start of the 1960s, and this process continued over the following 
decade.  On 2 July 1968, the Board of the Reserve Bank of Australia (the central bank)  
‘noted the longer-term trends in the directions of Australian trade and in the location of 
public indebtedness, and felt that on these grounds the disposition of our reserve remained 
too heavily weighted towards sterling’.25  This example shows the erosion of underlying 
economic and financial integration between Australia and the UK that took place during the 
pivotal decade of the 1960s, a pattern that was repeated elsewhere. 
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    On the British side, the benefits of the sterling area were also receding as the focus of 
international economic relations turned toward Europe with the first application to join the 
EEC in 1961.26  Despite the rejection of this initiative in 1963 and then again in 1967, joining 
the EEC remained the target of successive British governments in the 1960s, culminating in 
the accession to the Community in 1973.  The role of sterling as an international currency 
and the persistence of the sterling area network’s preferred access to the London market 
was a particular obstacle to accession, as was made clear in de Gaulle’s emphatic ‘non’ in 
November 1967 when he declared that ‘a Common Market [is] incompatible (…) with the 
state of the pound sterling’.27  For Britain, as for the overseas sterling area, the recovery and 
growth of markets in Europe and the USA meant that the freer trade and payments among 
the sterling area members was a less compelling priority for economic relations than in the 
immediate post-war period. 
     Nevertheless, as the Bretton Woods framework based on the dollar showed evidence of 
weakness, sterling continued to have a role to play in the smooth operation of the 
international monetary system.  From a global perspective, abandoning sterling’s 
international role would reduce international liquidity.  The US government was particularly 
sensitive to threats to sterling in international markets which might spread to a loss of 
confidence in the dollar.  As a result, the UK was able to attract substantial bilateral support 
from the US and multilateral support from the G10 central banks through the Bank for 
International Settlements (BIS) during the 1960s.28  Meanwhile members of the IMF, OECD 
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and G10 were embroiled in prolonged discussions over how to replace national currencies 
as reserve assets, culminating in the innovation of the Special Drawing Right (SDR) in 1968.29  
In the end, however, the SDR never replaced the role of the dollar in global reserves and the 
system continued to rely on national currencies as reserve assets. 
     Table 2 shows the share of sterling in the foreign exchange reserves of four major 
independent sterling area members and the colony of Hong Kong in the run-up to the 
devaluation of sterling in November 1967.  Clearly the pace and extent of diversification 
varied across members so that by October 1967 Australia and Singapore had diversified 
their reserves substantially, although over half was still denominated in sterling.  In contrast, 
New Zealand (where trade and commercial ties were still much more focussed on the UK) 
and Malaysia (where central bankers negotiated diversification with the UK) held much 
larger proportions of their reserves in sterling.  The Hong Kong government operated a 
sterling-based currency board and experienced dramatic growth of the economy and money 
supply in the 1960s, which swelled their sterling reserves.30  
 
Table 2: Share of Sterling in Foreign Exchange Reserves 
 
Australia New Zealand Malaysia   Singapore Hong Kong 
1964 79 98 96 100 99 
1965 70 97 96 98 99 
                                                     
29
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1966 69 97 90 93 99 
Jun-67 64 80 87 74 99 
Oct-67 60 85 82 50 99 
Dec-68 46 76 58 44 99 
Source: C. Schenk, The decline of sterling; managing the retreat of an international currency 
1945-1992, Cambridge, 2010, p. 296. 
 
     The devaluation of sterling in 1967 marked a sharp departure for the sterling area and 
also for the international monetary system more generally.  After a repeated series of 
annual summertime crises in confidence in sterling, the pound was finally depreciated by 
14.3% in November 1967.31  Since national currencies of the sterling area did not generally 
follow sterling, this depreciated the purchasing power of their foreign exchange reserves.  
Nevertheless every country re-pegged to sterling and the sterling area formally continued.  
In the aftermath, the British Treasury and government reassessed the role of sterling in the 
international monetary system and made contingency plans to suspend convertibility 
and/or float the pound.32   
     The survival of the sterling area through this crossroads testifies to how loose its relations 
had become.  There was no collective discussion in advance or coordinated response among 
the sterling area members.  The reaction ranged from a quiet but resentful acceptance that 
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the British government had taken the only option left to it (in the case of Australia) to 
outrage at the lack of consultation (Hong Kong) to a strong sense of betrayal (Malaysia and 
Singapore).33  Many sterling area countries had already begun to diversify their reserves as 
part of the realignment of their international economic relations and to spread risk, but 
there were challenges to finding a reliable alternative anchor.  At this point the dollar had 
also lost many of its attractions after the US Treasury imposed taxes on overseas lending 
from 1963 and the dollar’s gold value and the exchange rate against the DM and the Yen 
became more fragile.  While Australia and New Zealand, for example, would have liked to 
expand their holdings of DM, Yen and Swiss Francs, the issuing central banks imposed 
restrictions on the use of these currencies as national reserves in order to insulate their 
domestic economies from fluctuations in the international monetary system.34  The ensuing 
run on the dollar through the first quarter of 1968 seemed to vindicate those who resisted 
the international use of their currency, as well as justifying the support that sterling had 
attracted as part of the bulwark to defend the Bretton Woods system.  After the end of the 
fixed dollar price of gold in March 1968, the survival of the system appeared to rely even 
more on propping up its two (uneven) pillars – the pound and the dollar - until alternatives 
could be found.  The SDR was supposed to be the long term solution to reduce the role of 
the dollar, but this ambition required several years of transition.  The outcome for sterling 
was the Basel Agreement of September 1968, which marked the next stage in the 
disintegration of the sterling area. 
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     During the 1960s, therefore, the links that drew sterling area countries together 
continued to erode.  Political ties were weakened by decolonisation, and the diversification 
of trade and payments led to a natural diminution of economic integration.  Thus the trade 
relations of members shifted to Europe, Asia and the USA while the capital market in 
London was tightened and opportunities arose in Europe to borrow both dollars and 
European currencies.  British interests became much more clearly directed at the EEC at the 
expense of trade relations with traditional trading partners in the Commonwealth.  There 
remained a shared interest in supporting the exchange rate of sterling, since the bulk of 
each member’s reserves was in sterling, but this was undermined by the unilateral 
devaluation of November 1967. 
 
III Negotiating the end of the Sterling Area 
The aftermath of the 1967 devaluation established the institutional process for the end of 
the sterling area.  By this time the economic disintegration had already progressed for most 
members and the continuation of the sterling area might be viewed as a relic of the 
immediate post-war period that was difficult to dispense with.  From 1968 the strategy for 
Britain as well as for overseas members of the sterling area was clearly to manage 
disengagement while avoiding a tipping point that would push sterling into collapse.  
Despite the new avenues for international borrowing that emerged from the mid-1960s 
London continued to be the main capital market for sterling area governments.  Preferred 
access for sterling area countries was expected to be abandoned when Britain joined the 
EEC, but sterling area governments were not willing to anticipate this unwelcome 
eventuality by unilaterally removing themselves from the sterling area.   
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     As noted above, throughout the 1960s the G10 central banks (through the BIS) supported 
sterling through a series of lines of credit and currency swaps.  After the devaluation of 
November 1967, a new arrangement was negotiated, known formally as the Second Group 
Arrangement (informally as the Basel Agreement).  Under the First Group Arrangement of 
June 1966, the G10 central banks had offered a $1 billion line of credit to reimburse the 
Bank of England for diversification of reserves by the sterling area.35  The goal was to reduce 
the first mover advantage of any member of the sterling area; with the strength of the G10 
central banks behind Britain’s central reserves there would be less incentive to be the first 
to dump sterling assets in anticipation of devaluation.  As it turned out, it was not the 
official reserves held in central banks of the sterling area that proved to be the most volatile 
source of speculative pressure on the pound in 1967, but private holdings outside the 
sterling area.   
     The Second Group Arrangement in September 1968 also aimed to forestall diversification 
by increasing the credibility of Britain’s defence of the (new) exchange rate.  Under the 
Basel Agreement, the Bank of England was offered a $2 billion line of credit to reimburse 
the reserves in case of diversification.  This time, given the recent devaluation of the pound, 
the risk of first mover advantage leading to a tipping point was much greater.  Any residual 
‘loyalty’ of the sterling area to sterling had been effectively destroyed.  The G10 central 
banks therefore insisted that in return for the line of credit, the British government had to 
negotiate with each of the 34 sterling area territories to establish a minimum sterling 
proportion for their national reserves.  This drastically reduced the likelihood that the line of 
credit would be drawn.  To get the sterling area to agree to abandon sovereignty over their 
reserves composition in this way, Britain offered to guarantee the dollar value of 90% of 
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their official reserves.  The Sterling Agreements, signed as an adjunct to the Basel 
Agreement, marked a drastic change in the organisation of the sterling area. 
     An important further element of the Sterling Agreements provides evidence of how 
members of the sterling area viewed their participation in the network.  The Australian 
government led the way in insisting that, not only did they require a guarantee of the dollar 
value of their reserves, but they would not sign up to the Minimum Sterling Proportion 
(MSP) unless there was a guarantee of continued access to the London capital market.   The 
British government finally agreed to a formal side letter to the sterling agreement that 
stipulated that if Britain imposed new capital controls on investment in Australia the Sterling 
Agreements would be renegotiated.  Furthermore, if Australia was unable at any time to 
refinance maturing debt in London, the sterling amount would be added to the notional 
amount of sterling reserves in the calculation of the MSP.  Thus, Australia could diversify 
their reserves more if they were unable to raise refinancing through London.  Moreover, any 
foreign currency borrowing that affected the reserves would not be included in the 
calculation of the MSP for the first three months, so the sterling agreement would not 
restrict access to other capital markets.  After being negotiated by Australia, this side letter 
agreement was then extended to other sterling area countries.  Table 3 shows the range of 
countries with which the British government was able to secure bilateral contracts and the 
level of the minimum sterling proportion.  In most cases this reflected the status quo ante 
and so prevented further diversification after the debacle of the devaluation of 1967. 
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Table 3: Sterling Agreements of 1968-71 Minimum Sterling Proportions in Reserves 
Territory MSP (%) Territory MSP (%) 
East Caribbean Currency 
Authority 
100 Zambia 65 
Gambia 100 Nigeria 60 
Hong Kong 99 Jamaica 57 
Barbados 97 Ireland 55 
Mauritius 95 Uganda 51 
British Honduras 90 Cyprus 50 
Bahamas 80 Dubai 50 
Bermuda 80 Iceland 45 
Ceylon 80 Australia 40 (47) 
Ghana 80 Malaysia 40 (45) 
Guyana 80 Pakistan 40 
Malawi 80 Singapore 40  
Trinidad 80 Jordan 25 
Malta 75 Tanzania 25 
Bahrain 70 Kuwait 25 (54) 
New Zealand 70 Libya 18 (50) 
Sierra Leone 70 India 13 
Source: Schenk, Decline, p. 295. 
      Figure 3 shows that the amount of sterling held in reserves of participating countries 
increased by £2 billion from 1968 to the peak in the fourth quarter of 1972.  The share of 
sterling in reserves rose sharply in the two quarters after the first sterling agreements were 
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signed but then declined gradually until 1971 when overall reserves were run down due to 
balance of payments difficulties.  From early 1972 there was a sharp and sustained decline 
in the sterling share of reserves as these countries rebuilt their foreign exchange reserves.   
 
 
After the negotiation of the Sterling Agreements in 1968, the character of the sterling area 
was transformed from a voluntary association of states that had traditional economic and 
commercial ties to the UK to a formalised network of bilateral contracts between the UK 
and various members.  The Exchange Control Act still identified the ‘Scheduled Territories’  
that pegged their exchange rates to sterling and held the bulk of their reserves in sterling 
and the preferred access to the London capital market was still a protected feature under 
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UK exchange control. However, the benefits that drew the partners together had eroded to 
such an extent that the system had to be stabilised through contractual arrangements. 
     The focus of sterling area government strategy was on the ability to borrow and retaining 
exchange rate stability.  As the global system based on the dollar floundered from the 
collapse of the Gold Pool in March 1968 and US inflation increased, shifting their pegged 
exchange rates from sterling to the dollar did not seem an attractive option.  In August 
1971, President Nixon suspended gold convertibility and threatened trade sanctions unless 
Japan, West Germany and other currencies were revalued against the dollar.  The US 
Administration thus forced a general realignment of exchange rates to increase the 
competitiveness of US production and combat the deficit.  President Nixon’s ultimatum, 
accompanied by the removal of support for the US exchange rate, marked the culmination 
of two years of US deliberation over how to reform their role in the international monetary 
system.36  When the pegged exchange rate system was restored in December 1971, the 
margins between sterling and the dollar were widened, which left sterling area members 
with a potentially larger band against the US dollar.  Australia and New Zealand chose at this 
time to shift their exchange rate peg to the dollar in order to minimise the volatility against 
this currency.  Table 4 shows that several other members of the sterling area followed.  
Malaysia and Singapore retained the peg to the pound since they were in the midst of a 
complicated disentanglement of their own monetary union.37   The Middle Eastern states 
also retained sterling as their anchor currency given the operations of UK oil companies and 
the substantial share of oil royalties still paid in sterling. 
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Table 4: Dates when the Anchor currency moved from the Pound to the Dollar 
India August 1971 
Pakistan September 1971 
Kenya October 1971 
Nigeria November 1971 
Ghana November 1971 
Malaysia June 1972 
Singapore June 1972 
Kuwait June 1972 
South Africa October 1972 
Source: International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on Exchange Restrictions, various 
issues. 
The Sterling Agreements of 1968-71 were renewed for a further three years in September 
1971, just after the Nixon Shock threw the architecture of the international monetary 
system into disarray.  By the time the dust had settled with the Smithsonian Agreement of 
December 1971, the new Sterling Agreement already seemed out of date.  The British 
refused to adjust the trigger point to invoke the dollar value guarantee despite the 
depreciation of the dollar against the pound.  For the second agreement, therefore, sterling 
could depreciate 8.5 per cent before compensation was payable.  But sterling did not 
survive in the Smithsonian Agreement for long.   
     In the summer of 1972, sterling’s new exchange rate came under increasing threat and a 
run quickly accumulated.  In June alone £1.14 billion flowed out of the Bank of England in 
foreign exchange.  The main drawers in the sterling area included Malaysia, Singapore and 
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Kuwait who all had scope within their sterling agreements to diversify their holdings.38  
Instead of yet another step-change devaluation the British government chose to embark on 
a ‘temporary’ float of the pound.  At the same time, the decision was taken quietly to 
introduce exchange control on the Scheduled Territories so the sterling area was contracted 
to the Republic of Ireland and the Channel Islands.  By the end of 1972, therefore, the main 
former sterling area countries had re-pegged their exchange rates to the dollar after 25 
years the sterling area system was at an end.  Nevertheless, only Malaysia chose this 
moment to abrogate their Sterling Agreement by unilaterally diversifying their reserves 
beyond the agreed limits under the Sterling Agreement and so lost access to the guarantee.  
The usefulness of the sterling agreements outlived the sterling area they were meant to 
solidify. 
     The continuation of the Sterling Agreements through to 1974 suggest that they overtook 
the Exchange Control Act provisions as a means of ensuring continued access to the London 
market in exchange for signatories retaining a substantial amount of their reserves in 
sterling.   The increased volatility of the exchange markets during the collapse of the Bretton 
Woods system made the exchange rate guarantee more valuable.  By October, the sterling 
float drew the sterling exchange rate below the trigger point for compensation and the first 
payments under the guarantee cost the British £58 million.  The second set of Sterling 
Agreements expired in September 1973, but the British government encouraged a renewal 
for six months at a lower MSP and most countries agreed.  The new terms capped the 
amount of guaranteed sterling reserves (rather than merely a percentage) to discourage 
new accumulations and limit British exposure.  The trigger point was also adjusted to take 
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into account the devalued dollar.  Compensation amounting to £100 million was eventually 
paid in compensation under this set of Agreements. 
    During the second and third round of sterling agreements the global pegged exchange 
rate system collapsed, Britain joined the EEC and the balance of global economic power 
lurched toward the Middle East with the Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) oil price shock of October 1973.  Nevertheless, the sterling agreements system 
persisted.  The sterling exchange rate was more flexible, but there were still worries about 
the resilience of the UK foreign exchange reserves.  With a general election looming, in 
March 1974 the British government renewed the Sterling Agreements one final time for a 
further nine months to the end of that year.  The terms reflected the new environment: 
MSPs were reduced further and the trigger was shifted to the value of the effective 
exchange rate rather than the bilateral dollar exchange rate. 
 
IV Conclusions 
Monetary integration has complex and profound political facets, as has been exposed most 
starkly in the Eurozone crises of 2010.  While monetary union among sovereign states is 
therefore historically unusual, greater integration of economies has been sought through 
pegged exchange rate regimes which confer the benefits of policy credibility (if the anchor 
economy is stable) combined with a plausible exit strategy should circumstances change.  Of 
course, the periodic readjustments that characterised the postwar decades showed that the 
discretionary element of pegged rates tended to undermine the credibility of the peg and 
promoted speculation once international capital flows were liberalised.   While the sterling 
area was not an example of monetary integration, it did provide a sustained framework for 
international monetary relations among a diverse group of large and small, high and low 
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income per capita economies for thirty years.  Based on pegged exchange rates, freer capital 
flows and some elements of policy coordination (in the early years), the sterling area was an 
important element in the post-war international monetary system. It emerged from the 
collection of countries that had pegged to sterling in the storm of the interwar depression 
and from the controls introduced as part of Britain’s economic war effort.  In the immediate 
post-war years the operation and rationale for the sterling area was closely identified with 
the accumulation of substantial British war debts, but from the mid-1950s the character of 
the system began to change into one of mutual benefit.   
     That the sterling area persisted for so long through such a transformation of the 
international monetary system is remarkable.  The advantages that the sterling area 
generated for overseas members, for Britain and for other stakeholders in the global system 
(including USA and the G10) were instrumental in determining the institutional supports 
that allowed it to persist.   From 1952 it was not a closed system of tightly integrated 
members.  Nor was it the forum for significant coordination of policy.  Instead, it offered a 
source of stability in uncertain times, both for the exchange rate regime and for access to 
international borrowing.  As the economic focus of the members of this network turned to 
Europe, Japan and the USA, the ties that bound the system together weakened and it relied 
increasingly on the support from third parties.  Unlike 1931 or 1949, members of the 
sterling area did not follow the devaluation of sterling against the dollar in 1967 and from 
1968 the sterling area was redefined by formalised agreements to retain a proportion of 
reserves in sterling.  The main enduring element of the original sterling area was the 
continued importance of access to the London capital market, but even this eroded as 
capital markets in Europe and the USA became more competitive.  Eliminating the sterling 
area in 1972 was in the end a mere footnote to the more profound shift in British policy 
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toward exchange rate flexibility and a commitment to economic integration with Western 
Europe through membership of the EEC.  Without much ado, the main vestige of the 
economics of empire was quietly abandoned.      
